Desiree Sainthrope, a distinguished legal expert with deep experience in international trade and technology, joins us today. Her work at the intersection of global compliance and intellectual property provides a unique lens through which to view one of the most significant tech policy challenges of our time: the future of TikTok in the United States. We’ll explore the intricate legal and technical knots surrounding the platform’s algorithm, the practicalities of insulating it from foreign influence, and the persistent security questions that shadow its 170 million American users. This conversation aims to unravel the complexities of a deal that attempts to balance national security with the realities of a globally interconnected digital landscape.
The 2024 law prohibits “cooperation” between ByteDance and a US entity on the algorithm. Given the possibility of a licensing agreement, what legal and technical hurdles exist, and how could the US owners prove they have genuine control over this core technology?
The primary legal hurdle is the very definition of “cooperation” in the 2024 law. A licensing agreement, by its nature, creates an ongoing relationship, which could easily be interpreted as a form of cooperation. The central issue, as former CISA Director Chris Krebs noted, is whether the U.S. entity truly owns and controls the system or is merely renting it. From a technical standpoint, proving genuine control is a monumental task. It’s not enough to just possess the code; the new entity must demonstrate complete operational independence—the ability to modify, update, and run the algorithm without any input or reliance on ByteDance. To satisfy regulators, they would need a firewall that is not just contractual but also technical, likely involving extensive, continuous audits by a trusted third party to ensure no hidden backdoors or dependencies remain.
The deal involves retraining the recommendation algorithm on U.S. user data to allay security risks. Could you detail the step-by-step process of such a retraining, and what metrics would verify that the potential for foreign influence has been successfully neutralized?
Retraining the algorithm is essentially an attempt to create a new digital brain for the app, one that’s exclusively shaped by American user behavior. The process would begin by isolating a “clean” version of the core algorithmic model and migrating it to a secure, U.S.-based infrastructure. From that point, it would be fed only with new and existing U.S. user data, learning patterns and preferences from the ground up. Verifying its neutrality is the real challenge. You’d need sophisticated analytical tools to continuously monitor the content recommendations for statistical anomalies or patterns that don’t align with organic user engagement. The key metric wouldn’t be user satisfaction, but rather the certifiable absence of inorganic content amplification that could suggest a foreign propaganda push.
If ByteDance retains some influence over the algorithm via a licensing deal, what specific leverage could it exert over the content seen by 170 million American users? Please walk me through a plausible scenario of how this might play out in practice.
If ByteDance retains leverage through a licensing deal, its influence could be subtle yet incredibly powerful. Imagine a scenario where a geopolitical event occurs that is sensitive to the Chinese government. ByteDance could, through technical means embedded in the licensed code or through contractual pressures, subtly tweak the algorithm to de-prioritize videos that are critical of its government’s position. Simultaneously, it could slightly amplify content that supports its narrative. This wouldn’t be an overt ban; it would be a quiet shaping of the discourse, a digital thumb on the scale. For the 170 million American users, the feed would still feel personal and engaging, but the overall information ecosystem they inhabit would have been invisibly curated to favor a foreign power’s interests.
Since 2022, TikTok has been banned on federal government devices, yet many politicians are active on the platform. Can you explain the practical security distinctions here, and what specific safeguards are necessary for high-profile officials using the app on personal devices?
The distinction is about containing a perceived threat within a specific, high-risk environment. The No TikTok on Government Devices Act of 2022 was designed to protect federal networks and sensitive government data from potential surveillance or compromise. A government device contains official communications, location data, and access to internal systems, making it a prime target. When politicians like President Trump, Vice President Vance, or Governor Newsom use TikTok on what are presumably personal devices, the direct risk to federal systems is lower. However, the personal risk to them and the potential for them to be targets of influence or disinformation campaigns remains high. For these officials, necessary safeguards would include using a dedicated, single-purpose device for the app, disabling location services and microphone access when not in use, and receiving regular briefings from security staff on potential manipulation tactics they might encounter on the platform.
What is your forecast for TikTok?
My forecast is that we are entering a prolonged period of legal and technical battles. The 2024 law has set a collision course, but the path to a genuine divestiture that satisfies U.S. national security concerns without destroying the platform’s value is incredibly narrow. I anticipate a series of court challenges from ByteDance that will test the constitutionality of the law, buying them more time. Simultaneously, the technical negotiations around any potential sale or licensing of the algorithm will be immense. Ultimately, I believe the most likely outcome is a complex, heavily monitored licensing arrangement with a U.S. entity, one that will be under constant scrutiny from lawmakers and regulators for years to come. The era of TikTok operating with ambiguity is over; it has now become a permanent fixture in the U.S.-China tech rivalry.
